Touro Law Review
Volume 30

Number 1

Article 14

May 2014

In Re Allers: A Display of Progress, Not Perfection, in the
Guardianship System
Melanie Rosen

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Elder Law Commons, and the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Rosen, Melanie (2014) "In Re Allers: A Display of Progress, Not Perfection, in the Guardianship System,"
Touro Law Review: Vol. 30: No. 1, Article 14.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss1/14

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

In Re Allers: A Display of Progress, Not Perfection, in the Guardianship System
Cover Page Footnote
30-1

This comment is available in Touro Law Review: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss1/14

Rosen: In Re Allers: A Display Of Progress

IN RE ALLERS: A DISPLAY OF PROGRESS, NOT
PERFECTION, IN THE GUARDIANSHIP SYSTEM
Melanie Rosen
I.

INTRODUCTION

Article 81 of New York’s Mental Hygiene Law was created
with the intention of promoting the welfare of an incapacitated person
by establishing a system for the appointment of a guardian. 1 The law
applies to proceedings for appointing a guardian for personal or property management needs.2 The significance of this provision has been
amplified in recent years.3 Several demographic trends have enabled
researchers to predict an increased number of guardianship appointments in the coming years.4 In 2003, 35.9 million people in the United States were of ages sixty-five and older.5 By 2030, with the Baby
Boomers coming of age, that number is expected to double.6 Additionally, the number of people aged eighty-five and older is expected
to grow from 4.7 to 9.6 million by 2030.7 Alzheimer’s disease and
dementia cases have also become far more prevalent, doubling since
1980.8 As a consequence, reliance by Allegedly Incapacitated Persons (“AIPs”) and their families, counsel, and the courts upon Article
81 and its body of law will become even more frequent in the near fu
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1
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 2013).
2
Id.
3
Naomi Karp & Erica F. Wood, Guardianship Monitoring: A National Survey of Court
Practices, 37 STETSON L. REV. 143, 149 (2007) (referring to guardianship as an important
tool in today’s society nationwide).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Karp & Wood, supra note 3, at 149-50.
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ture.9
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,10
which has been inconsistently applied to Guardianship Proceedings,
is replicated in the New York State Constitution.11 The purpose of
the Fifth Amendment is to safeguard several individual civil liberties
and, more specifically, to protect against self-incrimination.12 Although this privilege originally extended only to criminal proceedings,
its interpretation has evolved13 and was recently applied in a civil
Guardianship Proceeding.14
In In re Allers,15 the Supreme Court of Dutchess County determined that a temporary guardian needed to be appointed for the
AIP, G.P.16 On July 19, 2012, the court found that G.P. required assistance with his property management needs, but found that appointment of a personal needs guardian was unwarranted.17 G.P. attended the hearing with his court-appointed attorney, where the
opposing counsel representing the Department of Social Services
(“DSS”) attempted to call G.P. to the stand to testify as a witness to
the proceeding.18 G.P.’s attorney objected, and the court sustained
the objection.19 On July 26, 2012, the New York Supreme Court of
Dutchess County, declining to follow a pair of appellate court decisions, held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination did, in fact, protect AIPs from being compelled to testify at their Guardianship Proceedings.20
AIPs in civil Guardianship Proceedings are just as vulnerable
as others who are protected by the right against self-incrimination,
9

Jan Ellen Rein, Ethics and the Questionably Competent Client: What the Model Rules
Say and Don’t Say, 9 STAN. L. & POL. REV. 241 (1998).
10
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11
Michael Prisco, Note, Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division, Fourth Department In Re Heckl, 25 TOURO L. REV. 1327, 1340 (2009).
12
Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
13
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967) (upholding a juvenile’s right against selfincrimination in a non-criminal proceeding).
14
See In re Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d 902, 906 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. 2012) (holding that an
AIP can invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).
15
Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d 902.
16
Id. at 903. Throughout the article, as is common in guardianship proceedings, aliases
given to the parties by the court will be utilized. Frequently, these aliases consist of the parties’ names reduced to an acronym.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
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such as criminal defendants, because they can demonstrate a deprivation of liberty.21 Not only is an AIP vulnerable to coercion because
of his or her particular mental or physical incapacity, but there is a
greater risk that he or she might lose certain individual freedoms.22
This Comment will explore the recent decision of Allers as it relates
to the Fifth Amendment and Guardianship Proceedings, and how Article 81 of the New York State Mental Hygiene Law is a well-needed
step forward in the protection of AIPs and their constitutionally protected right against self-incrimination.
II.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND AIPS

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified in
1791,23 and was replicated in the New York Constitution.24 At first,
the Fifth Amendment only applied to actions by the federal government, but the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment extended these individual protections to the States.25 The Fifth Amendment was
enacted to safeguard the people from majoritarian impulses, and it
provides five distinct liberties: (1) the right to be indicted by an impartial Grand Jury before being tried for a federal criminal offense,
(2) the right to be free from multiple prosecutions or punishments for
a single criminal offense, (3) the right to remain silent when prosecuted for a criminal offense, (4) the right to have personal liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and (5) the right to receive just compensation when the government
takes private property for public use.26
Designed to promote the public’s well-being, the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination protects individuals from
making inculpatory statements.27 This right was developed in reaction to certain historical practices, which compelled criminal defend-

21

In re United Health Servs. Hosps., Inc., 785 N.Y.S.2d 313, 317 (Sup. Ct. Broome Cty.
2004).
22
Id.
23
See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE
L.J. 408 (2010) (discussing “the textual and historical evidence regarding the original meanings of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment[s]”).
24
Prisco, supra note 11, at 1340.
25
United Health Servs. Hosps., Inc., 785 N.Y.S.2d at 313-14; see Gault, 387 U.S. at 49.
26
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
27
7 CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 42:141.
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ants to “admit guilt from their own lips.”28 The right against selfincrimination is broadly interpreted to assure that an individual is not
compelled to provide evidence that may be used against him or her.29
The components of the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination are: “(1) the right of a witness not to incriminate himself; (2) the right of a defendant in a criminal trial not to take the witness stand at all; and (3) the right of such a defendant not to have his
failure to take the stand commented upon.”30
The right against compelled self-incrimination is ordinarily
not a self-executing device; it must be claimed. As such, citizens
seeking its protection must assert their Fifth Amendment right in a
timely fashion.31 Of the very few exceptions to this generally selfexecuting device, one is the Miranda right to remain silent.32 Another limited exception applies when “an individual is subjected to a
practice that denies him a free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to
answer, then . . . an individual does not need to invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination in order to have his admissions suppressed
in an ensuing criminal prosecution.”33 In determining whether a person’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination has been violated, the Court considers the significance of the testimony and
weighs it against the prejudice to the party.34
Originally, the right against self-incrimination did not attach
in all instances.35 The text of the Fifth Amendment limited the right
28

Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974); see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S.
463, 470 (1976) (stating “the development of this protection was in part a response to certain
historical practices, such as ecclesiastical inquisitions and the proceedings of the Star Chamber, ‘which placed a premium on compelling subjects of the investigation to admit guilt from
their own lips.’ ”).
29
Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461 (1975).
30
United States ex rel. Miller v. Follette, 278 F. Supp. 1003, 1007 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd,
397 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1968).
31
United States v. D.F., 857 F. Supp. 1311, 1323 (E.D. Wis. 1994); see Roberts v. United
States, 445 U.S. 552, 559 (1980); see also Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976)
(stating that once an individual “discloses the information sought, any incriminations. . .are
viewed as not compelled,” and the privilege is no longer available).
32
Roberts, 445 U.S. at 560.
33
United States v. Saechao, 418 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “the probationer’s answers to incriminating questions posed by his probation officer are deemed compelled and are inadmissible in ensuing criminal proceedings”) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted); Id. at 1081.
34
United States v. Humphrey, 696 F.2d 72, 75 (8th Cir. 1982); see United States v. Gould,
536 F.2d 216, 222 (8th Cir. 1976).
35
Ryan v. C. I. R., 568 F.2d 531, 541-42 (7th Cir. 1977); see Gault, 387 U.S. at 49 (stating that juvenile proceedings are technically “civil” and do not fall within the original, ex-
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against self-incrimination to criminal proceedings.36 There has been
great controversy amongst judges regarding how the Fifth Amendment should be interpreted, and the Supreme Court has attempted, on
several occasions and in various situations, to determine exactly what
falls within the protections of the Fifth Amendment.37 However, today, in the State of New York, the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination has been applied in non-criminal proceedings regarding juveniles,38 as well as in family court proceedings.39 Interestingly, only recently have the courts in New York protected an AIP’s
right against self-incrimination in Guardianship Proceedings.40
III.

IN RE ALLERS

On July 13, 2012, the court gathered to determine whether
G.P. was going to be appointed a temporary guardian for his personal
care and property management needs.41 G.P. did not consent to the
appointment of a guardian.42 The Commissioner of Social Services
of Dutchess County (“DSS”) called G.P. to the stand to testify as a
witness, but G.P.’s attorney objected, and ultimately, the court sustained the objection.43 On July 19, 2012, although the application for
a personal care guardian was denied, a temporary guardian for G.P.’s
property needs was appointed.44
On July 26, 2012, a hearing was held to determine whether
G.P.’s temporary guardian should be made into a permanent guardian.45 Prior to the hearing, DSS submitted a letter stating that G.P.
should have previously been required to testify and requested that he
plicit meaning proscribed by the Fifth Amendment).
36
Ryan, 568 F.2d at 541-42.
37
See Gault, 387 U.S. at 49 (stating that “the availability of the privilege does not turn
upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked . . . . [F]or example, [it can]
be claimed in a civil or administrative proceeding, if the statement is or may be
inculpatory”).
38
In re White, 334 N.Y.S.2d 476, 480 (Fam. Ct. Nassau Cty. 1972).
39
In re Ashley, 683 N.Y.S.2d 304, 305 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1998); see Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (stating “[t]he privilege can be
claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or
adjudicatory”).
40
See Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d 902.
41
Id. at 903.
42
Id. at 904.
43
Id. at 903.
44
Id.
45
Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
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be ordered to do so.46 DSS cited two Fourth Department, Appellate
Division decisions, both of which held that an AIP could be compelled to testify at his or her own guardianship hearing.47 The Department of Social Services argued that, because no Second Department decisions address the issue, the court should rely on those
Fourth Department decisions.48
The judge discussed the many protections that Article 81 provides, including the rights to proper notice, legal representation, the
right to demand a jury trial, and the right to be present at, and participate in, any and all hearings.49 However, the judge also noted that
Article 81 was “noticeably silent” on the issue of whether an AIP
must testify at his or her own Guardianship Proceeding.50
The court in Allers treated the letter as a motion in limine and
denied the request.51 The court held it did not agree with the Fourth
Department’s interpretation of the statute.52 Instead, on July 26,
2012, the New York Supreme Court of Dutchess County held that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination did, in fact,
protect an AIP from being compelled to testify at his or her own
Guardianship Proceeding.53 The judge held that the Fourth Department decisions were wrong and unreliable for the present use because
they relied on a now-outdated statute, Article 77.54 The judge noted
that the new and improved Article 81 standard is much more difficult
to satisfy because decisions must be based upon clear and convincing
evidence, rather than merely best interests.55 The court went on to
explain that the legislature intended to “heighten right[s] previously
absent” when it implemented Article 81.56 The Judge determined that
the decision in In re United Health Services Hospitals, Inc.57 was a
more appropriate application of the rule, and that the AIP should not

46

Id.
Id. at 904 (citing In re Heckl, 840 N.Y.S.2d 516 (4th Dep’t 2007)).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
51
Id. at 903.
52
Id. at 906
53
Id.
54
Id. at 905 (stating that Mental Hygiene Law Article 77 was in effect at the time of the
previous decisions).
55
Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
56
Id.
57
785 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. Broome Cty. 2004).
47
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be compelled to testify at her hearing.58
Aside from the court’s most recent decision regarding the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Guardianship
Proceedings, the court in Allers explained that Article 81 continues to
be described as a statute “at war with itself,” “containing language
suggesting that some decisions should be made in the best interest of
the AIP,” and creating “contradictory notions of an adversarial model
and a paternalistic model.”59 Some suggest that Guardianship Proceedings should be treated like traditional litigation, basing decisions
upon the technicalities of the law in order for a party to prevail. 60
Others, on the contrary, believe Article 81 should be used as a guideline, which must meet the “best interest[s]” of the AIP, while placing
little emphasis on the rules of evidence.61
IV.

ARTICLE 81
A. History

On April 1, 1993, Article 81 became effective and the former
guardianship statutes, Articles 77 and 78, were repealed.62 A study
by New York’s Law Revision Commission had revealed that Articles
77 and 78 were failing to provide adequate protection to incapacitated
persons.63 While Article 77 catered to the monetary and property
needs of the incapacitated person, it did not address any personal
needs.64 Article 78, on the other hand, authorized the appointment of
a committee that would address these personal needs, but only if the
court found that the AIP was totally incompetent.65
Since “[a] finding of incompetence was a drastic measure,
58

Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
Id. at 904 (quoting Daniel G. Fish, Does the Fifth Amendment Apply in Guardianship
Proceedings?, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 25, 2011).
60
Daniel G. Fish, Does the Fifth Amendment Apply in Guardianship Proceedings?,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 25, 2011.
61
Id.
62
Rosann Torres, Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law: Designed to Protect the Elderly,
But Prejudicing Children's Rights, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 303, 309 (1998).
63
Id. at 310.
64
Id. at 309.
65
Id. at 310; see EDWIN KASSOFF, ELDERLAW AND GUARDIANSHIP IN NEW YORK § 11:4
(1996) (describing the inadequacies of Articles 77 and 78 stating “Article 78 went beyond
financial matters, authorizing the appointment of a committee that could exercise control
over the personal life of a person judged to be incompetent”).
59
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which could deprive individuals of their civil rights,” the court was
reluctant to employ Article 78.66 Consequently, the courts’ decisions
often favored the use of Article 77, resulting in inadequate protection
for the personal welfare of incapacitated persons.67 In an attempt to
correct this inadequacy, the legislature enacted Article 81, which addressed simultaneously both the personal and property-related needs
of AIPs.68 Article 81, the new and improved standard, did away with
“the labels of incompetency and substantial impairment in Articles 77
and 78 and their requirement of some underlying illness or condition.”69 Using a least restrictive means standard, Article 81 outlines
the powers of guardians as fiduciaries to maintain the property and
person of incapacitated persons.70
B. Appointment of a Guardian
Appointment of a guardian under Article 81 is based on clear
and convincing evidence rather than the previous “best interests”
standard.71 This is an improved attempt at affording AIPs heightened
rights, which were previously absent.72 Article 81 entitles the AIP to
“proper notice, legal representation, the right to demand a jury trial,
the right to be present at any hearing, present evidence and otherwise
participate.”73 Article 81 was enacted with the legislative purpose of
addressing the “needs of persons with incapacities [which] are as diverse and complex as they are unique to the individual.”74 Although
an appointed guardian is given authority to satisfy the needs of the
incapacitated person, this power can only be exercised in cases where
the court sees it absolutely necessary for the specific individual.75 By
narrowing the power of the guardian’s authority, the AIP is able to
maintain the “greatest amount of independence and selfdetermination and participation in all the decisions” made.76
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Torres, supra note 62, at 310 (quoting KASSOFF, supra note 65).
Id. at 310-11.
Id. at 313.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02 cmt. 2.
Id. at § 81.02(a)(2).
Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
Id.
Id. at 904.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01.
Id. at § 81.03(d).
Id. at § 81.01.
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To appoint a guardian, the court must consider less restrictive
alternatives, such as employing visiting nurses, homemakers, home
health aides, adult day care services, trusts, and representative and
protective payees.77 In determining whether the appointment of a
guardian is appropriate for the personal and property needs and safety
of an AIP, a two-pronged test is applied.78 First, the court must determine that an appointment is necessary to provide for the AIP’s
needs.79 Second, if the AIP does not agree to the appointment of a
guardian, the court must find that he or she is incapacitated. 80 This
includes reviewing available information such as the court evaluator’s report.81
Since Article 81 is flexible in order to conform to the needs of
each individual, it closes the loophole for those who need some assistance, but for whom a full-time guardian is not necessary.82 In these
instances, the appointment of a temporary guardian is an option.83
Temporary guardians are also appointed in emergency situations involving suspected victimization or manipulation.84 In those situations, the temporary guardian has the power to put a hold on the
AIP’s personal bank account and other assets until the court can fully
review the matter.85
C. Court Evaluator
In collecting evidence, court evaluators are appointed to investigate the Article 81 petition and seek to insure that the AIP’s best
interests are considered.86 The court can appoint a court evaluator
77

Id. at § 81.03(d)-(e); see also Leslie Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental
Illness-A Legal and Appropriate Alternative?, 4 ST. LOUIS U.J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 279
(2011) (discussing acceptable alternatives to guardianship).
78
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02.
79
Id. at § 81.02(a)(1).
80
Id. at § 81.02(a)(2).
81
Id.
82
Id. at § 81.23(a)(1).
83
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.23(a)(1).
84
Id. at § 81.23; see In re Rochester Gen. Hosp., 601 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1993) (stating
that a temporary guardian was appointed in order to complete the Medicaid application because the AIP’s son had failed to do so in a timely manner).
85
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.23; see In re Ella C., 943 N.Y.S.2d 791 (Kings Cty. Sup.
Ct. 2011) (stating that the court appointed “[a] temporary guardian of Ms C., restrained all of
Ms C.'s children from interfering with her property rights, vacated any powers of attorney
she had given, and restrained financial institutions from releasing Ms C.’s assets”).
86
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(c)(4).
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once an order to show cause is issued.87 The duties of the court evaluator are extensive, and are imperative in making sure that the AIP’s
rights are protected.88 A court evaluator must meet with and interview the AIP and explain, in whatever manner necessary, “the nature
and possible consequences of the proceeding, the general powers and
duties of a guardian, [and] available resources.”89
The court evaluator must determine whether the AIP wants or
needs legal counsel.90 The court evaluator must then compose a written report and recommendation to the court.91 The report must be
based on the court evaluator’s personal observations, and include responses to the seventeen questions listed in New York Mental Hygiene Law, Article 81.92 It is the court evaluator’s duty to attend all
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id. at § 81.09(a).
Id. at § 81.09(c).
Id. at § 81.09(c)(1), (2).
Id. at § 81.09(c)(2).
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(c)(5).
See Id. at § 81.09(c)(5) listing the following questions for assessment:
(i) does the person . . . agree to the appointment;
(ii) does the person wish legal counsel of his or her own choice;
(iii) can the person . . . come to the courthouse for the hearing;
(iv) . . . is the person completely unable to participate in the hearing;
(v) if the person cannot come to the courthouse, would any meaningful
participation result from the person’s presence at the hearing;
(vi) are available resources sufficient and reliable to provide for personal
needs or property management without the appointment of a guardian;
(vii) how is the person . . . functioning;
(viii) what is the person’s understanding and appreciation of the nature
and consequences of any inability to manage the activities of daily living;
(ix) what is the approximate value and nature of the financial resources
of the person;
(x) what are the person’s preferences, wishes, and values with regard to
managing the activities of daily living;
(xi) has the person alleged to be incapacitated made any appointment or
delegation;
(xii) what would be the least restrictive form of intervention;
(xiii) what assistance is necessary for those who are financially dependent upon the person;
(xiv) is the choice of proposed guardian appropriate;
(xv) what potential conflicts of interest, if any, exist between or among
family members and/or other interested parties regarding the proposed
guardian or the proposed relief;
(xvi) what potential conflicts of interest, if any, exist; and
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court proceedings and conferences to adequately protect the AIP.93
A court evaluator may be any person drawn from a preapproved list by the Office of Court Administration, including:
the mental hygiene legal service in the judicial department where the person resides, a not-for-profit
corporation, an attorney-at-law, physician, psychologist, accountant, social worker, or nurse, with
knowledge of property management, personal care
skills, problems associated with disabilities, and the
private and public resources available for the type of
limitation the person is alleged to have.94
D. Counsel
If an AIP has not acquired private counsel, the court must appoint Mental Hygiene Legal Services (MHLS) in the judicial department where the AIP resides.95 MHLS is a New York State agency
that advocates, and is responsible for, the rights of people who are
admitted to all mental health, developmental disability, and drugtreatment facilities.96 If MHLS is appointed as counsel, and the
agency is already serving as court evaluator, MHLS will be relieved
from its appointment as court evaluator.97
E. Incapacity as the Standard
To appoint a guardian without the AIP’s consent, the court
must find that the AIP is incapacitated.98 The standard for incapacity
focuses on the decision-making capabilities and functional limitations
of the AIP.99 According to N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 81.12, the
petitioner bears the burden and must demonstrate the quantum of
(xvii) are there any additional persons who should be given notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
93
Id. at § 81.09(c)(9).
94
Id. at § 81.09(b)(1).
95
Id. at § 81.09(b)(2).
96
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 47.01(a); see, e.g., In re Alexis H., 572 N.Y.S.2d 194,195
(App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1991) (stating that MHLS provided legal assistance to patients and residents of schools for mentally retarded and family care homes).
97
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(b)(2).
98
Id. at § 81.02(2)(A).
99
Id. at § 81.02(c).
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proof required for a finding of incapacity. The petitioner must prove
incapacity by clear and convincing evidence.100 The petitioner must
also provide evidence that the AIP is likely to suffer some sort of
harm if the court does not intervene.101 These harms may be related
to a person’s inability to provide for his or her own personal needs, or
the management of his or her property.102 The court also looks at
whether the AIP is likely to suffer harm because he or she is unable
to comprehend the nature of his or her particular inability. 103 To determine incapacity, and the functional level and limitations of the
person, the court also assesses the AIP’s management of daily living
activities.104 Any and all physical and mental illnesses or prognoses
are considered, as well as substance dependence and any medications
that may affect the person’s behavior, cognition, or judgment.105
Typically, guardians, court evaluators, and the various professionals who provide services to AIPs are chosen from a list that is
preapproved by the court.106 However, there are circumstances in
which the court will not refer to the list.107 Such circumstances exist
when, among other instances, the proposed guardian is a relative of
the AIP or is a nonprofit entity.108 Once a guardian is found to be
necessary, the AIP must either agree to the appointment, or the court
must find the person to be incapacitated.109 A hearing is required in
either instance so that the court is able to assess the voluntariness of
the AIP’s consent and make findings regarding the powers to be
granted to the guardian.110
F. Substituted Judgment
Article 81 was enacted to provide narrowly tailored assistance
to persons unable to adequately care for themselves and their proper-

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Id. at § 81.12(a).
Id. at § 81.02(b).
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(b)(1).
Id. at § 81.02(b)(2).
Id. at § 81.02(c)(1).
Id. at § 81.02(c)(4).
Id. at § 81.09(b)(1).
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.1(b) (2013).
See Id. (listing banks and trust companies as other exceptions).
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(a)(2).
Id. at § 81.11(c).
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ty.111 Often these limitations extend to an AIP’s inability to make
reasoned judgments, warranting “the authorization and exercise of
treatment powers by a guardian.”112 It is a legal standard of decisionmaking on behalf of AIPs, in which the guardian must take into account the personal “wishes and desires of an incapacitated person,”
while also using his better judgment for the health and well-being of
the AIP. 113 For example, an AIP suffering from schizophrenic delusions may believe he is cured and no longer needs treatment, or that
he is being medicated as part of some conspiracy.114 In such an instance, where the AIP’s best interests are not compatible with his
wishes, substituted judgment would be used.115 The common law
doctrine of substituted judgment is recognized by the courts in New
York,116 and “is an integral part of Article 81.”117
A court can only allow the use of the doctrine of substituted
judgment “if satisfied by clear and convincing evidence,” that it is
necessary.118 Evidence must prove:
that [t]he incapacitated person lacks the requisite mental capacity to perform the act or acts for which approval has been sought[;] . . . [that] . . . a competent,
reasonable individual in the position of the incapacitated person would be likely to perform the act or acts
under the same circumstances; [and that] [t]he incapacitated person has not manifested an intention inconsistent with the performance of the act or acts for
which approval has been sought . . . or, if such intention was manifested, the particular person would be
likely to have changed such intention under the circumstances existing at the time of the filing of the petition.119
111
In re Conticchio, 696 N.Y.S.2d 769, 770-71 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. 1999); see also
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(b)(1).
112
Conticchio, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 771.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
In re Shah, 733 N.E.2d 1093, 1099-1100 (N.Y. 2000); see also In re Florence, 530
N.Y.S.2d 981, 982 (Sur. Ct. 1988).
117
Conticchio, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 771.
118
Eugene E. Peckham, Last Resort Estate Planning Finds Acceptance in Statutes and
Cases Relying on Substituted Judgment, 74 N.Y. ST. B.J. 33, 34 (2002).
119
Id. (quoting N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21(e) (McKinney 2011)).
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The substituted judgment provision of Article 81 ensures that the
rights of AIPs are justly protected by “provid[ing] a method [of] last
resort.”120
V.

PREVIOUS HOLDINGS

In Allers, the court held that the authority cited by DSS was
inapposite because it was based on standards articulated before the
enactment of Article 81.121 The Fourth Department decision, In re
Heckl,122 relied on In re Lyon, a Second Department case.123 In Lyon,
the court applied the standard articulated in Articles 77 and 78 of the
Mental Hygiene Law.124 Because the enactment of Article 81 heightened the required standard of proof, the court in Allers held it was not
bound by stare decisis, and disagreed with Lyon.125
A. In re Lyon
In May of 1976, the Supreme Court of New York Appellate
Division, Second Department, reviewed the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Westchester County, which appointed a third party as the
guardian of AIP Lillian Lyon.126 The Appellant, the son of Mrs.
Lyon, argued that he should have been appointed conservator.127 The
“Appellant [was] the remainderman of [Mrs. Lyon’s] trust[,] which
provide[d] income for the support of his mother” if other allocated
funds were not sufficient.128 Contrary to the findings of the court, the
Appellant claimed that his mother’s care was “‘squandering’ in view
of her condition.”129
Mrs. Lyon, an 84-year-old quadriplegic, resided in a nursing
home, entirely dependent on others to care for her personal and property needs.130 Both Mrs. Lyon’s in-house caretaker and chauffeur
120

Peckham, supra note 118, at 38.
Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
122
840 N.Y.S.2d 516 (4d Dep’t 2007).
123
Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 906.; In re Lyon, 382 N.Y.S.2d 833 (2d Dep’t 1976).
124
Lyon, 382 N.Y.S.2d. at 835.
125
Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
126
Lyon, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 833 (explaining that at the time of the hearing the guardian was
called the conservator and the AIP was called the conservatee).
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
121
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provided testimony explaining that prior to her deteriorated mental
condition, Mrs. Lyon had expressed indifference about her son.131 A
nurse at the residence also testified that the Appellant never sent his
mother cards or did anything for her, and visited only twice in the
year prior to the hearing.132 Applying Article 77, which was the statute then in force, and in view of the evidence provided, the court
found no reason to disturb the arrangements; therefore, the petitioner,
a friend of the AIP, remained the best choice as Mrs. Lyon’s conservator.133
B. In re Heckl
In Heckl, Rosanna E. Heckl and her siblings sought to have
their mother, Aida C., declared incapacitated in order to have a
guardian appointed to watch over her property.134 The New York
Supreme Court of Erie County appointed a court evaluator and ordered the evaluator to meet with the AIP in hopes of assisting and
protecting her interests.135 The AIP then acquired counsel and moved
to vacate the order.136 The AIP argued that being forced to discuss
her personal business with a court evaluator violated her Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination because her responses
could be introduced as evidence against her in her Guardianship Proceeding.137 Therefore, her “liberty interest [was] at stake.”138 The
AIP argued that MHL § 81.10(g) allows an AIP to remove her court
evaluator when the court appoints counsel. Hence, this same rule
should apply when the AIP hires her own counsel.139
The court denied the AIP’s motion and ordered the court
evaluator to meet with the AIP immediately, whereby the AIP continued to refuse to speak with the court evaluator.140 The court gave

131

Lyons, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
Id.
133
Id. at 835.
134
Aida, C., 886 N.Y.S.2d at 296.
135
Heckl, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 518-19.
136
Id. at 518.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 519; see N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.10(g) (McKinney 2004) (stating that “the
court may dispense with the appointment of a court evaluator or may vacate or suspend the
appointment of a previously appointed court evaluator”).
140
Heckl, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
132
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the AIP one last chance to comply with the instructions before being
held in contempt.141 The AIP then appealed to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department.142 This court held that “the appointment of
a court evaluator did not violate the AIP’s constitutional rights.”143
However, the court did “reverse[] the order of [] contempt” against
the AIP.144 The appellate court agreed that the AIP’s liberty interest
was at stake,145 but concluded instead that the constitutional protections “against self-incrimination do[] not attach in all instances,” such
as administrative or civil proceedings.146 Because the AIP was not
subject to any type of criminal proceeding, the constitutional protection against self-incrimination did not apply.147
C. In re Gault
The court in Heckl referred to In re Gault,148 a United States
Supreme Court decision, “which [discussed the degree] to which the
U.S. Constitution protects the right against self-incrimination.”149 In
Gault, a minor was taken into police custody because he and another
boy had allegedly made lewd phone calls to a neighbor.150 Accompanied by his mother and older brother, the minor met with the judge
in his chambers to discuss the accusations.151 Neither he nor his accompanying family members were informed that the minor did not
have to make any statements.152 At the hearing, the judge provided
testimony concerning the minor’s undocumented statements from the
meeting.153
The judge determined that the minor was a delinquent and
committed him to a specialized school until he reached the age of majority.154 The minor’s counsel filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Id.
Prisco, supra note 11, at 1327.
Id. at 1330.
Id. at 1330-31.
Heckl, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
Id. at 520 (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 372 (1986)).
Heckl, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Prisco, supra note 11, at 1331.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 7.
Id. (stating that the age of majority is twenty-one).
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that he was not afforded the constitutional protections against selfincrimination that he otherwise deserved.155 The State argued that the
Fifth Amendment provided those protections only in instances related
to criminal matters and that juvenile proceedings were civil.156
“[The] Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.”157
The United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment could not be limited to a specific class of individuals or merely
to criminal proceedings.158 Instead, one must look to the “nature of
the statement of admission and the exposure which it invites.”159 The
Court held that even when a proceeding is non-criminal, the privilege
against self-incrimination might still be invoked.160 Here, the Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination was interpreted and
applied broadly.161
D. Allen v. Illinois
Allen v. Illinois significantly limited the scope and application
of the Fifth Amendment.162 The defendant in Allen was prosecuted
by the State of Illinois for “committing [] crimes of unlawful restraint
and deviate sexual assault.”163 The State attempted to have the defendant “declared a sexually dangerous person” and committed to a
psychiatric institution.164 As part of this process, the defendant had to
undergo a number of psychiatric examinations.165 Later, the defendant objected to the introduction of statements he made to the psychiatrists, claiming that his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination was violated.166 The trial judge advised the State to
155

Gault, 387 U.S. at 42.
Id. at 46.
157
Prisco, supra note 11, at 1333.
158
Gault, 387 U.S. at 49.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 59.
162
Allen, 478 U.S. at 375.
163
Id. at 365; see People v. Allen, 463 N.E.2d 135, 136 (Ill. 1984) (stating that the defendant was charged with unlawful restraint and deviate sexual assault “pursuant to Sections
11-3 and 10-3 of the Illinois Criminal Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, Ch. 38, Pars. 11-3 and 103)”).
164
Allen, 478 U.S. at 365.
165
Id. at 366.
166
Id.
156
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limit its testimony to include only the opinions of the examining psychiatrists.167
The court found the defendant “to be a sexually dangerous
person” and committed him to a mental health facility.168 The Appellate Court of Illinois for the Third District reversed, finding that the
defendant’s constitutional rights, outlined in the Fifth Amendment,
were not protected.169 The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed, finding that the defendant’s right against self-incrimination did not apply
in a civil proceeding concerning psychiatric treatment.170 The United
States Supreme Court affirmed, stating that the proceedings “were
not ‘criminal’ within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.”171 The Court stated that the precedent
set in Gault, declaring that the protections of the Fifth Amendment
are invoked whenever one’s liberty interests are at stake, is “plainly
not good law,” and that the Fifth Amendment was not applicable.172
VI.

THE HOLDING IN ALLERS

The court in Allers, held that United Health Services Hospitals was the most applicable and appropriate case on point.173 In
United Health Services, the AIP was called to the stand to testify
about his condition at his own Guardianship Proceeding.174 The
AIP’s counsel objected on the grounds that the AIP’s liberty interests
were at stake, claiming he could not be forced to testify according to
the United States and New York Constitutions.175 The New York
Supreme Court of Broome County had to determine whether an AIP
could be compelled to answer questions where the answers could directly affect the AIP’s liberty interest.176
The court felt that the deprivation of liberty faced by the minor in Gault was comparable to the liberties at stake in United Health
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Id.
Id. at 366.
Allen, 478 U.S. at 367 (relying on Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)).
Id. at 367 (relying on Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
Id. at 375.
Id. at 372.
Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 905 (citing United Health Servs. Hosps. Inc., 785 N.Y.S.2d

313).
174
175
176

United Health Servs. Hosps. Inc., 785 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
Id. at 316-17.
Id. at 313.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss1/14

18

Rosen: In Re Allers: A Display Of Progress

2014]

IN RE ALLERS: A DISPLAY OF PROGRESS

237

Services Hospital, Inc. in that both were subject to potential civil
commitment against their will, and the livelihood of the minors in
were dependent upon decisions made by others.177 The court in United Health Services addressed the holding in Gault, which stated that
“there is a threat of self-incrimination whenever there is a ‘deprivation of liberty’; [sic] and there is such a deprivation whatever the
name of the institution, if a person is held against his will.”178 Based
on this reasoning and because of the loss of liberty at stake, the court
found that the AIP could not be forced to testify at a Guardianship
Proceeding because doing so would be a denial of his or her constitutional protections against self-incrimination.179
VII.

WHAT HAS BEEN DONE, WHAT WE SHOULD DO, AND
WHAT IT ALL MEANS FOR THE FUTURE

Guardianship is going to become even more important in our
society in the coming years.180 It is a powerful legal instrument that
can bring about positive or negative effects upon a vulnerable population with impairments, “affording needed protections, yet drastically
reducing fundamental rights.”181 Demographic trends show that there
will be an “increased need for surrogate decision-making,” and therefore, a greater calling for the guardianship system as a whole.182 This
need will continue to climb as the population ages.183 Moreover, advances in medical technology have enabled human beings to live
longer and potentially outlive caregivers, necessitating more frequent
guardianship appointment.184 Additionally, the issues associated with
the guardianship system impact all parts of society.185 Individuals of
all social strata186 and ages with mental retardation, developmental
disabilities, and mental illnesses comprise growing populations who
utilize the guardianship system.187 For these reasons, the guardian177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187

Id. at 316-17.
Id. at 314.
United Health Servs. Hosps. Inc., 785 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
Karp & Wood, supra note 3, at 149.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 149-50.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 149-50.
Laura Lane, Justice for the Weakest, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 2006.
Id.
Karp & Wood, supra note 3, at 150.
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ship system will be used more frequently, and therefore, must be
monitored closely to protect this vulnerable and ever-growing population.188
AIPs and individuals involved in guardianship appointments
can be described as the “ ‘unbefriended’ population, that is, those
who have no family or friends available and qualified to serve as
guardian.”189 Guardians make a variety of critical care decisions, often with little knowledge of an AIP’s personal life or values, “sometimes with high [workloads] and insufficient staffing.”190 Elder abuse
inflicted by such caretakers has been the cause of harm accounting
for injury, exploitation, and mistreatment of between one and two
million Americans ages sixty-five and older.191 Oftentimes the
friendship a person forms “can initially appear innocent,” such as
where the AIP signs his house over to his guardian because he is
grateful to have someone caring for him, acting like a friend.192
However, these situations often result in the financial abuse of
AIPs.193
It is not far-fetched to expect the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination extends further than to merely protect criminal defendants194 because an AIP who has legally been categorized
as incompetent is far more vulnerable and susceptible to being taken
advantage of than a criminal defendant.195 This population is at an
even greater risk than criminal defendants, who have been provided
this protection, as Guardianship Proceedings may determine who will
be making medical and personal care decisions, such as, where an
AIP will reside, including the power to place the AIP in a nursing
home or residential care facility, and how their assets will be handled.196 The current guardianship system continues to be “complex,
fractured, insensitive, and uncaring to the needs of a very vulnerable

188

Id. at 184 (stating that “monitoring is at the very core of the court’s . . . responsibil-

ity.”).
189

Id. at 150.
Id. at 151.
191
Id. at 150.
192
Lane, supra note 185.
193
Id.
194
See Allen, 478 U.S. at 375 (holding that a criminal defendant is entitled to the right
against self-incrimination).
195
Karp & Wood, supra note 3, at 184 (referring to AIPs as society’s “most vulnerable”
members).
196
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.22(a)(1-9) (McKinney 2010).
190
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population.”197
A. What Has Been Done Thus Far?
In the past, “the impetus for [] change” in the guardianship
system came more from the press than from legal professionals.198
Prior to the formation of Article 81, the Associated Press put together
“an exposé of adult guardianship that caused a[n] [uproar nationwide], [] prompt[ing] Congressional hearings.”199 In response, an interdisciplinary conference took place where “national experts in law,
psychiatry and psychology, advocates, court administrators, and
judges” gathered.200 The conference generated the eponymous “
‘Wingspread Recommendations’, which were subsequently adopted
by the ABA House of Delegates.”201 In addition, a growing number
of not-for-profit and for-profit agencies, as well as public guardianship programs, developed to serve this at-risk, “unbefriended” population.202 Because of these and other efforts in the 1980’s, there was
a burst of guardianship reform.203
New York’s Mental Hygiene Law, Article 81 exemplifies
“the current paradigm in guardianship,” acknowledging the challenges set forth by earlier activists.204 In the past, many New York courts
have used a narrow interpretation of the Fifth Amendment as applied
to AIPs, focusing less on the rights at stake and more on the cause of
action or type of proceeding at hand.205 More recently, though, as
seen in Allers, the privilege has been applied more broadly to noncriminal proceedings.206
“Article 81 ushered in a new era in the treatment of mental

197

Lane, supra note 185.
Kristin Booth Glen, Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal Capacity, Guardianship, and Beyond, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 108 (2012).
199
Id. at 109.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Karp & Wood, supra note 3, at 150.
203
Glen, supra note 198, at 109; see A. Frank Johns, Ten Years After: Where is the Constitutional Crisis with Procedural Safeguards and Due Process in Guardianship Adjudication?, 7 ELDER L.J. 33, 78-79 (1999) (stating that “twenty-eight states introduced as many as
100 guardianship bills, passing as many as twenty-three in eighteen states.”).
204
Glen, supra note 198, at 111.
205
Heckl, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 298.
206
Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
198
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illness,” providing for the least restrictive form of intervention. 207
The new, stricter Article 81 protects an AIP’s Fifth Amendment right
to a greater extent than ever before.208 Therefore, reliance on cases
decided prior to the enactment of Article 81 is incorrect, and the
holding in Allers should be utilized instead. This process is what has
caused AIPs to question the application of the Fifth Amendment, as
the new standard has dealt with this issue inconsistently. Article 81
should act as an example of what guardianship statutes nationwide
should strive to mimic because it represents a profound step away
from a model of traditional litigation. Decisions prior to Article 81
show the arc of progress leading up to and following its implementation, but should not be relied on as precedent because the standard
has changed.
B. What Should We Do?
As proven by the effects of the Human Rights Movement of
the 1980’s, the people need to expect and demand incremental
change toward protection for AIPs in a more consistent manner. In
essence, involvement of the press is crucial. Aside from the efforts
put forth thus far and the decision in Allers, lower courts in New
York continue to act inconsistently regarding the application of the
Fifth Amendment to Guardianship Proceedings.209 Still unclear is
whether the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies
to Guardianship Proceedings in whole, or only in particular circumstances.
Although the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination was applied to an AIP taking the stand as a witness in
Allers, this privilege was not applied to statements made by an AIP to
a court evaluator in Heckl.210
In order to keep guardianship law moving, the Fifth Amendment must be consistently and permanently added as a safeguard to
all aspects of the guardianship system. Heckl needs to be reversed
because it highlights a major inconsistency that still exists and exemplifies how Article 81 was not an all-encompassing fix. Even in an
instance such as Heckl, where the improved Article 81 was applied,

207
208
209
210

Peckman, supra note 118, at 34.
Id.
Prisco, supra note 11, at 1340.
Id. at 1343.
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the AIP was not protected by the right against self-incrimination.211
The AIP’s worries were rational and she did not want to speak to a
court evaluator because she knew everything she said could be used
against her at a hearing as though she had taken the stand. Thus, the
AIP was faced with a predicament, having to choose between testifying or facing contempt of the court.212 The Fifth Amendment should
be applied, not only to protect an AIP against self-incrimination, but
also to conversations between the AIP and the appointed court evaluator, especially when the AIP is able to provide their own counsel.
Unfortunately, judges are forced to rely on historical precedent that argues that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination should not be applied in a civil proceeding. 213 However, the scope of the Fifth Amendment has broadened, and such an application is no longer warranted. Gault demonstrates that the United
States Supreme Court is in agreement that the scope of the Fifth
Amendment has broadened and that it should not only be applied to
specific populations.214 Judges need to adhere consistently to this
broadened interpretation, applying the right against self-incrimination
to all aspects of Guardianship Proceedings.
The decision in United Health Services has left an imprint on
the New York court system because it was the first of its kind drawing on the conclusions made in Gault.215 This court also supported
the notion that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
should not be narrowly applied. One can only hope that these decisions will act as an example for future issues related to the Fifth
Amendment and Guardianship Law in general.
C. Proposed Model
The holdings in Allers and United Health Services do not do a
great deal to “quell the concerns of AIPs.”216 Although the implementation of Article 81 was a huge stride forward, there is still room
to strengthen its protections. Article 81 continues to be “described as

211
212
213
214
215
216

Id.
Id. at 1330.
Johns, supra note 203, at 66.
Prisco, supra note 11, at 1337.
Id.
Id. at 1343.
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a statute at war with itself.”217 While some decisions suggest that
Guardianship Proceedings should be treated as “traditional litigation”
based upon the technicalities of the law, others treat Article 81 merely as a guideline to meet the “best interest[s]” of the AIP. 218 There is
still, however, a middle ground between these two extremes. In fact,
a more holistic approach may be the answer.219 AIPs deserve the
heightened standard of scrutiny introduced by Article 81, as well as
greater sensitivity in general. The system must look beyond the legal
paperwork and see the person.
Guardianship Proceedings deserve to be subjected to the
heightened standard of scrutiny introduced by Article 81, not only
because the individual’s liberty interest is at stake, but also because
decisions rely heavily on the discretion of a single judge220 determining mental capacity on a case-by-case basis.221 Historically, judges
appointed to Guardianship Proceedings have often “lack[ed] the requisite expertise,” having little or no training in mental health law or
psychiatry.222 It is not recommended that this discretion be taken
away from judges, but rather, that judges appointed to handle Guardianship Proceedings have an actual interest in the sensitive matters at
hand. Guardianship judges deal with particularly personal matters,
and have the ability to change an individual’s liberties. A judge with
a greater interest will likely treat these proceedings with greater sensitivity and attention.
A society can be judged by the way it “treats its weakest and
most vulnerable members.”223 For this reason, Guardianship Proceedings should not be treated as traditional litigation. There should
not be a strict adherence to the rules of evidence because the best interests of the AIP should be a priority. In fact, this is the goal those
who advocated for the implementation of Article 81 sought to
achieve.224 A special problem-solving courtroom with a less intimi217

Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 904 (quoting Fish, supra note 59).
Fish, supra note 59.
219
Lane, supra note 184.
220
Meta S. David, Legal Guardianship of Individuals Incapacitated by Mental Illness:
Where Do We Draw the Line?, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 465, 482 (2012).
221
Id. at 469.
222
William Brooks, The Tail Still Wags the Dog: The Pervasive and Inappropriate Influence By the Psychiatric Profession on the Civil Commitment Process, 86 N.D. L. REV. 259,
285-86 (2010).
223
Lane, supra note 185.
224
Fish, supra note 59.
218
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dating environment may be more conducive to this result. AIPs, who
often enter Guardianship Proceedings frightened and disoriented,
should never feel like they have done wrong; a guardianship courtroom should feel very little like a courtroom. Greater efforts must be
made to assure that AIPs are not frightened by the system or the
courtroom. In this regard, round-table discussions, rather than traditional court hearings, may provide a more conducive environment.
Integrating all pending cases involving an incapacitated person before a single judge may actually prove to be beneficial for the
mental well-being of an AIP who would no longer have to go from
courtroom to courtroom.225 Traditional guardianship caseloads are
six cases a day, five days a week.226 To provide greater sensitivity to
this population, caseloads should be lessened. By lessening each
judge’s caseload and appointing judiciary duties to judges who have
an interest in the issues associated with guardianship, judges will not
only be able to spend more time on individual matters, they will also
have a better chance of knowing the family and the circumstances,
“and can effectively work with the different parties to get things resolved” in the best interests of the AIP.227
VIII. CONCLUSION
The courts need to consistently apply the Fifth Amendment to
Guardianship Proceedings using a more holistic approach, while
striving for a happy medium between a strict application of the traditional rules of evidence and the guidelines provided by Article 81.
Although the law pertaining to Guardianship Proceedings has come a
long way toward protecting not only the property, but also the personal interests of AIPs, the current system continues to be one “in
which decisions are unpredictable and [] inconsistent.”228
The right against self-incrimination was created to maintain
the integrity of the courts by preventing the use of coerced statements
created by abhorrent methods such as force or psychological domination.229 These intentions, paired with the vulnerability of the popula225

Lane, supra note 185.
Id.
227
Id.
228
David, supra note 220, at 482.
229
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 520, 601 (1975); United States v. Massey, 437 F. Supp.
843, 856 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
226

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

25

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 1 [2014], Art. 14

244

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

tion utilizing the guardianship system, make AIPs most in need of
Fifth Amendment protections. Yet, historically, this right has been
applied far too narrowly. Until recently, the protection against selfincrimination excluded AIPs in Guardianship Proceedings, and even
today, this issue continues to be addressed inconsistently. It would
be surprising and totally illogical if the privilege against selfincrimination were available to hardened criminals, but not to AIPs.
In Allers, the court was not willing to apply stare decisis from
previous cases, which repealed former Articles 77 and 78, showing
that the enactment of Article 81 was an acknowledgement of the dire
need to heighten the protection of AIPs’ rights and to administer a
gentler approach instead.230 Allers displays a legislative distinction of
the improved standard. This heightened sensitivity applies not only
to constitutional rights, but also to the approach of the courts. Aside
from this most recent decision favoring the protection of AIPs,
Guardianship Proceedings in New York and nationwide still fail to
incorporate the kindness and sensitivity needed for this population.
Demographic trends underscore the dire need for the application of
the Fifth Amendment in Guardianship Proceedings when constitutional rights and financial resources are transferred to guardians, leaving AIPs with diminished capacity at the mercy of the guardians.
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